I consider the setting where reviewers offer very noisy scores for a number of items for the selection of high-quality ones (e.g., peer review of large conference proceedings) whereas the owner of these items knows the true underlying scores but prefers not to provide this information. To address this withholding of information, in this paper, I introduce the Isotonic Mechanism, a simple and efficient approach to improving on the imprecise raw scores by leveraging certain information that the owner is incentivized to provide. This mechanism takes as input the ranking of the items from best to worst provided by the owner, in addition to the raw scores provided by the reviewers. It reports adjusted scores for the items by solving a convex optimization problem. Under certain conditions, I show that the owner's optimal strategy is to honestly report the true ranking of the items to her best knowledge in order to maximize the expected utility. Moreover, I prove that the adjusted scores provided by this owner-assisted mechanism are indeed significantly moreaccurate than the raw scores provided by the reviewers. This paper concludes with several extensions of the Isotonic Mechanism and some refinements of the mechanism for practical considerations.

This paper is a discussion of the 2025 JASA discussion paper by Su et al. (2025). We would like to congratulate the authors on conducting a comprehensive and insightful empirical investigation of the 2023 ICML ranking data. The review quality of machine learning (ML) conferences has become a big concern in recent years, due to the rapidly growing number of submitted manuscripts. In this discussion, we propose an approach alternative to Su et al. (2025) that leverages ranking information from reviewers rather than authors. We simulate review data that closely mimics the 2023 ICML conference submissions. Our results show that (i) incorporating ranking information from reviewers can significantly improve the evaluation of each paper's quality, often outperforming the use of ranking information from authors alone; and (ii) combining ranking information from both reviewers and authors yields the most accurate evaluation of submitted papers in most scenarios.

It reports adjusted scores for the items by solving a convex optimization problem. Under certain conditions, I show that the owner's optimal strategy is to honestly report the true ranking of the items to her best knowledge in order to maximize the expected utility.

Machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) conferences including NeurIPS and ICML have experienced a significant decline in peer review quality in recent years. To address this growing challenge, we introduce the Isotonic Mechanism, a computationally efficient approach to enhancing the accuracy of noisy review scores by incorporating authors' private assessments of their submissions. Under this mechanism, authors with multiple submissions are required to rank their papers in descending order of perceived quality. Subsequently, the raw review scores are calibrated based on this ranking to produce adjusted scores. We prove that authors are incentivized to truthfully report their rankings because doing so maximizes their expected utility, modeled as an additive convex function over the adjusted scores. Moreover, the adjusted scores are shown to be more accurate than the raw scores, with improvements being particularly significant when the noise level is high and the author has many submissions -- a scenario increasingly prevalent at large-scale ML/AI conferences. We further investigate whether submission quality information beyond a simple ranking can be truthfully elicited from authors. We establish that a necessary condition for truthful elicitation is that the mechanism be based on pairwise comparisons of the author's submissions. This result underscores the optimality of the Isotonic Mechanism, as it elicits the most fine-grained truthful information among all mechanisms we consider. We then present several extensions, including a demonstration that the mechanism maintains truthfulness even when authors have only partial rather than complete information about their submission quality. Finally, we discuss future research directions, focusing on the practical implementation of the mechanism and the further development of a theoretical framework inspired by our mechanism.

I consider the setting where reviewers offer very noisy scores for a number of items for the selection of high-quality ones (e.g., peer review of large conference proceedings) whereas the owner of these items knows the true underlying scores but prefers not to provide this information. To address this withholding of information, in this paper, I introduce the Isotonic Mechanism, a simple and efficient approach to improving on the imprecise raw scores by leveraging certain information that the owner is incentivized to provide. This mechanism takes as input the ranking of the items from best to worst provided by the owner, in addition to the raw scores provided by the reviewers. It reports adjusted scores for the items by solving a convex optimization problem. Under certain conditions, I show that the owner's optimal strategy is to honestly report the true ranking of the items to her best knowledge in order to maximize the expected utility.

We conducted an experiment during the review process of the 2023 International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML) that requested authors with multiple submissions to rank their own papers based on perceived quality. We received 1,342 rankings, each from a distinct author, pertaining to 2,592 submissions. In this paper, we present an empirical analysis of how author-provided rankings could be leveraged to improve peer review processes at machine learning conferences. We focus on the Isotonic Mechanism, which calibrates raw review scores using author-provided rankings. Our analysis demonstrates that the ranking-calibrated scores outperform raw scores in estimating the ground truth ``expected review scores'' in both squared and absolute error metrics. Moreover, we propose several cautious, low-risk approaches to using the Isotonic Mechanism and author-provided rankings in peer review processes, including assisting senior area chairs' oversight of area chairs' recommendations, supporting the selection of paper awards, and guiding the recruitment of emergency reviewers. We conclude the paper by addressing the study's limitations and proposing future research directions.

In the setting of conference peer review, the conference aims to accept high-quality papers and reject low-quality papers based on noisy review scores. A recent work proposes the isotonic mechanism, which can elicit the ranking of paper qualities from an author with multiple submissions to help improve the conference's decisions. However, the isotonic mechanism relies on the assumption that the author's utility is both an increasing and a convex function with respect to the review score, which is often violated in peer review settings (e.g.~when authors aim to maximize the number of accepted papers). In this paper, we propose a sequential review mechanism that can truthfully elicit the ranking information from authors while only assuming the agent's utility is increasing with respect to the true quality of her accepted papers. The key idea is to review the papers of an author in a sequence based on the provided ranking and conditioning the review of the next paper on the review scores of the previous papers. Advantages of the sequential review mechanism include 1) eliciting truthful ranking information in a more realistic setting than prior work; 2) improving the quality of accepted papers, reducing the reviewing workload and increasing the average quality of papers being reviewed; 3) incentivizing authors to write fewer papers of higher quality.

In 2023, the International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML) required authors with multiple submissions to rank their submissions based on perceived quality. In this paper, we aim to employ these author-specified rankings to enhance peer review in machine learning and artificial intelligence conferences by extending the Isotonic Mechanism to exponential family distributions. This mechanism generates adjusted scores that closely align with the original scores while adhering to author-specified rankings. Despite its applicability to a broad spectrum of exponential family distributions, implementing this mechanism does not require knowledge of the specific distribution form. We demonstrate that an author is incentivized to provide accurate rankings when her utility takes the form of a convex additive function of the adjusted review scores. For a certain subclass of exponential family distributions, we prove that the author reports truthfully only if the question involves only pairwise comparisons between her submissions, thus indicating the optimality of ranking in truthful information elicitation. Moreover, we show that the adjusted scores improve dramatically the estimation accuracy compared to the original scores and achieve nearly minimax optimality when the ground-truth scores have bounded total variation. We conclude the paper by presenting experiments conducted on the ICML 2023 ranking data, which show significant estimation gain using the Isotonic Mechanism.

I consider the setting where reviewers offer very noisy scores for a number of items for the selection of high-quality ones (e.g., peer review of large conference proceedings) whereas the owner of these items knows the true underlying scores but prefers not to provide this information. To address this withholding of information, in this paper, I introduce the \textit{Isotonic Mechanism}, a simple and efficient approach to improving on the imprecise raw scores by leveraging certain information that the owner is incentivized to provide. This mechanism takes as input the ranking of the items from best to worst provided by the owner, in addition to the raw scores provided by the reviewers. It reports adjusted scores for the items by solving a convex optimization problem. Under certain conditions, I show that the owner's optimal strategy is to honestly report the true ranking of the items to her best knowledge in order to maximize the expected utility. Moreover, I prove that the adjusted scores provided by this owner-assisted mechanism are indeed significantly more accurate than the raw scores provided by the reviewers. This paper concludes with several extensions of the Isotonic Mechanism and some refinements of the mechanism for practical considerations.